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RETURNING TO A PRINCIPLED BASIS FOR DATA PROTECTION
Gus HoSEIN*
INTRODUCTION
We frequently hear that privacy and security or civil liberties and se-
curity are a trade-off-that they are bounded by one another.' A common
response to this assertion is citing the quotation from Benjamin Franklin
that those who give up liberty for security deserve neither. Surely we can
generate a more thoughtful response than this. Balance is a very simplistic
notion. It is not just security at stake versus individual liberties, and we
must do more than just seek to be both safe and free. There is much more at
stake. However, frequently when we try to do better, we actually seem to
drop out the discussion of underlying principles. 2
I. FORGETTING PRINCIPLES AND FOCUSING ON COSTS
Changes in commercial products based on government policy have
been prevalent recently. For example, data retention policies compel Inter-
net service providers (ISP's) and telephone companies to retain the data 3
they have on consumers such as the logs of telephone calls and e-mails sent
and received. When governments propose this policy they sound very rea-
sonable. They say, "Look, we need this, it is absolutely necessary to com-
bat terror threats; we understand this issue of privacy but we really need to
focus on more important issues. Just for now, we must balance privacy
away." And what do we say in return? We say these actions are very inva-
* Dr. Gus Hosein is a Visiting Senior Fellow at the London School of Economics in the Infor-
mation Systems and Innovation Group in the Department of Management.
1. For a discussion of the alleged tradeoffs of security and privacy see, for example, Candice L.
Kline, Security Theater And Database-Driven, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 443 (2008); Daniel J. Solove, Data
Mining And The Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343 (2008).
2. For a discussion of principles-based analysis see, for example, Melissa Harrison, The Evolu-
tion Of Montana's Privacy-Enhanced Search And Seizure Analysis: A Return To First Principles, 64
MONT. L. REV. 245 (2003).
3. For a discussion of data retention, see, for example, Francesca Bignami, Privacy And
Law Enforcement In The European Union: The Data Retention Directive, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 233
(2007); Caspar Bowden, Closed Circuit Television For Inside Your Head: Blanket Traffic Data
Retention And The Emergency Anti-Terrorism Legislation, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5
(2002); Catherine Crump, Data Retention: Privacy, Anonymity, And Accountability Online 56
STAN. L. REV. 191 (2003).
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sive and illegal under either the constitution of country X, or the European
Convention of Human Rights. 4
As privacy advocates we have also become expert at public policy
analysis. We therefore sometimes go a little further and point out that reten-
tion as a policy is very costly for telephone companies and ISPs, thereby
attaching a profit-oriented concern. Companies say privacy-invasive 5 tac-
tics are going to be costly. In turn, the cost is going to be imposed on the
consumer. Consequently, the debate quickly moves to focus on the costs of
the policy.
For instance, when privacy advocates took on the data retention policy
in the European Union, we argued that data retention invades the privacy of
Europeans, that it is illegal under the European Convention on Human
Rights, threatens consumer confidence, burdens European industry, and
will require even more invasive laws to make it work. Too often, however,
the only argument that people listen to is that it is going to be costly.
A. The Third Body Problem: Industry
The cycle of these stories are quite typical: bad policy is proposed,
civil libertarians complain about privacy, get some attention but not much,
and policy moves forward nonetheless. So we then resort to other methods
and generate more concern and broader coalitions.
One prime example of this is travel surveillance. Countries around the
world are establishing legal and technological requirements to gain access
to passenger data for domestic flights using the rationale of combating
terrorism. 6 Civil Libertarians step in and argue that these approaches are
invasive because if you look at what programs plan on doing with this data,
4. For a discussion of the European Convention of Human Rights, see D.J. HARRIS, M. O'BOYLE
& C. WARBRICK, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 283-301 (1995). For jurisprudence on Article 8,
please see Douwe Korff, The Standard Approch Under Articles 8-11 ECHR and Article 2 ECHR,
Presentation Before at the European Commission Justice and Home Affairs Conference (May 19-20,
2009).
5. For a discussion of privacy invasion, see, for example, Daniel Gomez-Sanchez, Copyright
Law, Privacy, And Illegal File Sharing: Defeating A Defendant's Claims Of Privacy Invasion, 24
TOURO L. REV. 73 (2008); Daniel P. O'Gorman, Looking Out For Your Employees: Employers' Surrep-
titious Physical Surveillance Of Employees And The Tort Of Invasion Of Privacy, 85 NEB. L. REV. 212
(2006).
6. For a discussion of passenger data, see, for example, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-06-374T, AVIATION SECURITY: SIGNIFICANT MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES MAY ADVERSELY
AFFECT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S SECURE FLIGHT
PROGRAM (2006); SECURE FLIGHT WORKING GROUP, REPORT OF THE SECURE FLIGHT WORKING
GROUP (2005), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/sfwg-report-091905.pdf, Timothy
M. Ravich, Is Airline Passenger Profiling Necessary?, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2007); Peter M. Shane,
The Bureaucratic Due Process Of Government Watch Lists, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 804 (2007).
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they plan on analyzing it and profiling citizens. 7 It is hard to get people to
care about their personal privacy in the face of the governments' recom-
mendation. But when we also say actions are going to be costly, and that a
significant cost to the air carriers will be passed on to consumers, concern
grows in both public and political circles. Time and inconvenience also
play a role, where people do not want to be subjected to greater delays due
to additional security controls, such as early check-ins required due to data
processing. In turn, industries may be placed at a competitive disadvantage,
like how rules apply differently to travel by air or rail.8
The increased cost factor is usually because there is now an interme-
diary for modern surveillance: the private sector. This often introduces a
barrier for a governments' deployment of surveillance policy, but equally,
it permits a less accountable deployment of surveillance techniques.
Industry can be called upon to deploy government surveillance in
ways that the state is unable to do itself. For those who do not remember
the 1990's crypto war days,9 the Clinton administration was obsessed with
trying to make sure we use government-approved security technologies lo
that would allow for back door access to law enforcement. 11 Now we are
seeing this discussion replicated in connection with developing intercept
capabilities in communication systems including voice over IP. 12 China has
ordered various software producers and hardware producers to change
7. For a discussion of profiling, see, for example, Murad Hussain, Defending The Faithful:
Speaking The Language Of Group Harm In Free Exercise Challenges To Counterterrorism Profiling,
117 YALE L.J. 920 (2008); Ruth Singer, Race Ipsa? Racial Profiling, Terrorism And The Future, I
DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 293 (2008).
8. For a discussion of the challenges introduced by security measures to a variety of travel infra-
structures, see UK HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE THIRD REPORT ON E-BORDERS, HOUSE OF COMMONS
(2009).
9. For a discussion of the crypto wars and the Clipper Chip, see, for example, Vandana
Pednekar-Magal, The State And Telecom Surveillance Policy: The Clipper Chip Initiative, 8
COMM. L. & POL'Y 429 (2003); A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is The Key: Cryptography,
The Clipper Chip, And The Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 709 (1995); Janine S. Hiller, From
Clipper Ships To Clipper Chips: The Evolution Of Payment Systems For Electronic Commerce,
17 J.L. & COM. 53 (1997).
10. For a discussion of cryptography, see, for example, David Banisar, Stopping Science: The
Case Of Cryptography, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 253 (1999); Christopher D. Hoffman, Encrypted Digital
Cash Transfers: Why Traditional Money Laundering Controls May Fail Without Uniform Cryptogra-
phy Regulations, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 799 (1998); Marcus Maher, International Protection Of U.S.
Law Enforcement Interests In Cryptography, 5 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13 (1999).
11. For a discussion of wiretapping capabilities, see, for example, Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping
Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553
(2007).
12. For example, see Testimony of Ms. Laura Parsky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Crimi-
nal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Trans-
portation on the VOIP Regulatory Freedom Act, S. 2281, June 16, 2004.
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technology in order to allow for surveillance, for example. 13
Ironically as the relationships between government, citizens, and in-
dustry change, governments all argue the same thing: that they are just
trying to maintain the status quo. That is, in the face of changing technolo-
gies, they contend that what all of their policies are trying to do is to stay
on top of these changes. There is very little room for discussion of principle
when governments use these convincing ideas from arguments long ago
settled. That is, the principle of privacy was considered originally when
interception law was established, and rather now the problem in our midst,
according to governments, is the mere modernization of these policies.
Therefore, we are almost compelled to focus our energies on debates re-
garding feasibility and the challenges to industry. Put another, way, when
we start getting into the argument about circumventing the laws, costs and
anticompetitive effects, we have already lost the opportunity for the prin-
cipled debate about whether or not these approaches are a good idea.
B. The Fourth Body: Technology
Moving from a two body problem, which consists of the battle be-
tween government needs and individual rights interests, the three body
problem of industry's involvement has introduced a further challenge: the
role of technology. The introduction of Internet surveillance using the legal
regimes for traditional surveillance has significant implications for both
human rights and industry, even as governments contend they are merely
modernizing their powers.
New technologies are often perceived as being progressive as we rare-
ly consider the ramifications of their use on traditional infrastructures. Eu-
ropeans generally quietly nod when it comes to ID cards, 14 as they imagine
their 'cards' are indeed just that: paper, cardboard, or perhaps plastic items
containing some information. A modern identity card is very much differ-
ent, however; in fact, a card is not even required. The British Government
is in the process of introducing exactly such a card: a plastic card contain-
ing a chip and radio-frequency identification to transmit biometric informa-
13. For a discussion of the surveillance of Skype communications in China, see NART
VILLENEUVE, BREACHING TRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY PRACTICES ON
CHINA'S TOM-SKYPE PLATFORM: A JOINT REPORT OF THE INFORMATION WARFARE MONITOR AND
THE OPEN NET INITIATIVE ASIA (2008). This led to a response from Skype's president, Josh Silverman.
Skype President Addresses Chinese Privacy Breach, http://share.skype.com/sites/en/2008/10/skype
president_addresses.chin.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2009).
14. For a discussion of identity cards see, for example, Adrian Beck and Kate Broadhurst, Polic-
ing the Community: The Impact of National Identity Cards in the European Union, 24 J. ETHNIC &
MIGRATION STUD. 413 (1998); Clare Sullivan, The United Kingdom Identity Cards Act 2006-Civil or
Criminal?, 15 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 320 (2007).
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tion on individuals, and all these data will be stored on a central register. A
system of this scale has never been done before. Essentially, they are re-
quiring that a national register database be created with a file on every resi-
dent in the United Kingdom with ten fingerprints, face scans, and the like.
Every time you open a bank account, every time you cross the border,
every time you interact within the public and private spheres, you would be
required to be verified against that central database.
There are serious civil liberties concerns, especially with the idea of
fingerprinting the entire population. British authorities also intend to use
this fingerprint data for verifying against fingerprints at the scene of
crimes. As the government was portraying Britain as the only country
without ID cards, thus attempting to demonstrate that ID cards were not a
gross personal interference, they were concealing the identity system's role
as a law enforcement measure. A more Euro-friendly British population
wasn't likely to have the same view of identity cards as they have previous-
ly held, that is that cards were a Germanic concept, evoking memories of
Nazi Germany or Communist Europe. 15 As such, we knew we were not
going to win the debate based on civil liberties concerns, so we decided to
focus on the fact that the system being proposed was unprecedented, highly
complex, untested, and required a significant investment.
Experts at the London School of Economics and Political Science
wrote a report to analyse the Government's proposals, supported by years
of research bringing together expert groups. 16 Although we spent less than
10% of the report focusing on the cost of the government's proposed sys-
tem, and focused much more on the technological challenges, the likely
costs received the bulk of the media coverage and parliamentary attention,
and that is when people started to get angry. That is when people started
changing their minds about the card, and the support for the policy dropped
significantly. So again, this meant that the time for principled debate was
over, and we are now just worrying about the practical issue of costs. Even
the technological debate was reduced to a discussion of costs rather than
feasibility, effectiveness, and the social implications of fingerprinting an
entire population. Privacy is thus not the only victim of a simplified public
discourse.
15. Former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher famously attacked ID cards as a 'Germanic' con-
cept. For more information regarding identify cards, see, for example, Rob Hyde & Lena Schlenzka
Identity Crisis Over UK Cards, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK, Mar. 8, 2005, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/
4195483/ldentity-crisis-over-UK-cards.html.
16. See LSE Identity Project Reports, http://identityproject.se.ac.uk/#LSE.Identity-Project_
Reports (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
2010] 807
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
B. The Future of Principled Privacy Arguments
Modem laws now implicate many more actors than the citizen and the
state. Industry and technology are also affected by policy shifts. Whereas
we used to focus on principled debates on whether policy change was ne-
cessary or needed, now our policy debates are possibly more pragmatic and
focus on costs. Any complexity involving legalities, feasibility or technolo-
gical uncertainty are more interesting to audiences when they are summa-
rized as costs and economic imbalances. This dumbing-down of public
policy debates is troublesome.
If people have nothing to hide, what do they fear? The answer is the
cost. This pragmatic approach is spreading toward all these other civil li-
berties and privacy related policy areas. Has it come to a point where it
basically comes down to industry to decide whether or not policy is a good
idea based on how easy or challenging it is for them to deploy?
Complex policy questions need to be raised as our policies are becom-
ing more technological, economically, and socially complicated. Yet we
are dumbing down our policy processes too often by focusing on costs. We
need to return to our traditional public policy analyses that have more mul-
ti-faceted approaches.
Most importantly we must assess the roles that technologies will play
in the future of policy-making. When we do consider technology, we first
look at costs, then at effectiveness, and perhaps eventually at matters of
principle. So we ask questions like "do the technologies work?" Even if
they do not, we have hope that technologies improve over time. For in-
stance, if we are not going to oppose ID cards on the basis of civil liberty
constraints, then perhaps we can focus on asking whether the biometrics
work? Early studies indicate that biometrics do not easily work the way we
hope, particularly when we imagine deployment at a national scale with 60
to 100 million people with ten fingerprints in the database for day-to-day
use. 17 But, then when we point out this pragmatic fact and try to cultivate
the debate, people come back saying that the technology will get better.
Even if we question whether the technology will ever truly work, it is
merely another distraction away from the principled debate. So while it is
highly questionable whether technologies will ever work as perfectly as the
policy-makers dream, perhaps we must entertain their imaginative visions
for the sake of having a real debate.
17. For a good discussion of biometric challenges, see GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
CHALLENGES IN USING BIOMETRICS, STATEMENT OF KEITH A RHODES TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION POLICY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, AND THE CENSUS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2003).
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So let's presume that the technology gets better and these things ac-
tually did work. If our closed-circuit television cameras1 8 really could rec-
ognize your face and whether you are a wanted terrorist, that would be
helpful. Does that mean the debate is over? If it really is cost efficient and
technologically feasible, our cost benefits are actually measurable. But can
and should we really measure it that way? If suddenly ID cards became
incredibly cheap tomorrow, does that mean the policy is a good idea?
That is what we are facing if we move to this pragmatic debate. If we
implement communications data retention at all communication points
globally, with the cost of storage actually decreasing dramatically year to
year, the actual cost of implementing communication data retention will
fall. Once this cost has declined, does that mean we actually like data reten-
tion? Again, if we move into the pragmatic debate as if there are no conse-
quences, we are going to be caught in this technology argument. Often the
only other voice in these debates is again industry, and where they choose
to fall within these debates will determine the outcome.
The debate must be first about principle, then we can focus on public
policy analysis. Approaching it any other way leaves too much to fortune.
18. For a discussion of CCTV, see, for example, Clive Norris & Michael McCahill, Cctv: Beyond
Penal Modernism?, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 97 (2006).
2010] 809

